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SODOMY AND POLYGAMY
Elizabeth M Glazer*
Response to: Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules,
and Bargainingfor Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2010).
INTRODUCTION

In her Article Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality,' Professor Adrienne Davis argues that the frequently
invoked analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamy has been a red
herring 2 in the debate about polygamy, distracting collective attention away
from polygamy's multiplicity, its "truly distinctive, and legally meaningful"
feature. 3 This analogy, Davis observes, has been made by polygamy's
strongest proponents as well as its strongest opponents. 4 As a result of its
ability to distract, Davis argues that the gay marriage analogy has caused
scholars to neglect what Davis considers the more pressing questions about
polygamy, namely "whether and how polygamy might be effectively
recognized and regulated, i.e., licensed." 5 She answers these questions by
proposing a regulatory model based on commercial partnership law for
polygamous marriages.
I should disclose upfront that this Response does exactly what Davis
warns against-namely, chasing the red herring that is the analogy between

Associate Professor of Law. Hofstra University School of Law, 2006-Present; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 2004; M.A., Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 2001; B.A.,
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 2001. Thanks very much to Alafair Burke, Adrienne
Davis, Dasi Ginnis, Michael Gurary, Andy Koppelman. Jide Nzelibe, Rachel Peckerman. Nadia
Sawicki, and Kim Yuracko for helpful conversations about the ideas contained in this Response.
1. 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2010).
2. See, e.g., id. at 1958 ("This Article argues that the gay marriage analogy ... is a red
herring, a distraction from the real challenge polygamy raises for law .... .).
3. See id. at 1957 ("[W]hile the gay analogy may make for splashy punditry and good
television, it distracts us from what is truly distinctive, and legally meaningful. about polygamynamely, its challenges to the regulatory assumptions inherent in the two-person marital model.").
4. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (noting gay analogy has been invoked by both
sides of polygamy debate).
5. Davis, supra note 1, at 1958.
*
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same-sex marriage and polygamy. 6 It uses Davis's examination of the samesex marriage analogy to polygamy in order to examine why a better analogynamely, that between sodomy and polygamy-has not been quite as frequently
invoked. Davis did acknowledge that "[a]nalogies are powerful in the liberal
legal arsenal," and that "the gay [marriage] analogy is the battleground on
which the cultural war over expanded recognition for alternative family
structures is being fought," so perhaps she will forgive this one relapse.7
After reconstructing Davis's argument in Part 1, this Response argues in
Part 11 that those in favor of legally recognizing polygamous marriage should
analogize it to sodomy rather than same-sex marriage, for two possible reasons
in addition to the reason that Davis proffered, namely that polygamy's
multiplicity distinguishes it essentially from same-sex marriage. First, since
the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas8 in 2003, the effort to lift
sodomy bans has been much more successful than the effort to win legal
recognition for same-sex marriages. 9 Second, sodomy and polygamy share in
common a history of criminalization which same-sex marriage does not,
further weakening the analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamy.10
This Response then argues that an analogy to same-sex marriage, not sodomy,
has survived despite the obvious differences between same-sex marriage and
polygamy because of a resistance to discussing the specific sexual acts that go
on between members of the same sex. It is these sexual acts, of course, that
highlight the differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.
In Part III, this Response argues that, when fighting for rights on behalf of
sexual minorities, II advocates should remember not only the ways in which
these minorities are similar to the sexual majority but also the ways in which

6. A focus on the accuracy of analogies is not unique in legal scholarship and has even been
done with respect to same-sex sodomy. See Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to
Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1165, 116869 (2006) (arguing Lawrence was better analogized to McLaughlin v. Florida. 379 U.S. 184
(1964). which decriminalized "fornication" between members of different races, as opposed to
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967), which decriminalized marriage between members of
different races).
7. Davis. supra note 1. at 1986.
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (reviewing limited success of fight for same-sex
marriage).
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (noting same-sex marriage has not been criminalized
historically).
11. A note on terminology: In this Response, I use the term "sexual minorities" to refer to
all those whose sexual preference or gender identity cause them to fall within the minority of the
population. I include polygamists in this group. When I use the initialism "LGBT," I do so to
refer only to lesbians, gay. bisexual and transgender people. And when I use the term "gay," I do
so in order to refer to gay and lesbian people, but not to bisexual or transgender people. I have
discussed the need to be explicit about naming groups within the broader category of sexual
minorities in other work. See. e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer. Naming's Necessity, 19 Tul. J.L. &
Sexuality 166, 167 (2010) (urging scholars who write about law as it relates to sexual orientation
and gender identity to consider words they use to refer to their constituent group); Elizabeth M.
Glazer, Sexual Reorientation. 100 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1690590 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("[T]he act of naming is an important step toward making visible those distinctions that
even those who perceive them cannot express adequately before those distinctions are named.").
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they are different.1 2 This Part draws on the history of the LGBT rights
movement to argue that the movement's strategy-which has been to
demonstrate how its constituents are just like everybody else-deviates from
its purpose, which has been and should be to protect difference. Favoring an
analogy to same-sex marriage as opposed to sodomy is but one example of the
salience of similarity as opposed to difference in the LGBT rights movement.
A better LGBT rights movement, this Response ultimately argues, is one that
protects difference-a movement that is unafraid of sodomy and unafraid of
incorporating polygamists into its constituency.
I. THE ANALOGY AS DISTRACTION: PROFESSOR DAVIS'S ARGUMENT
Davis argues that the analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamy
has distracted attention from polygamy's serial multiplicity, which, according
to Davis, is polygamy's distinctive feature. In light of this distinctive feature,
Davis proposes a model based on commercial partnership law to regulate
polygamy.
A. Two Same-Sex MarriageAnalogies
Davis argues that the analogy between polygamy and same-sex marriage
has had a distracting effect on the debate about the legal recognition of plural
marriages. 13 Davis observes astutely that this analogy has been invoked by
both sides of the polygamy debate, perhaps increasing its ability to distract the
attention of all of those participating in a debate as opposed to only those on
one side.
Polygamy's opponents have invoked the "slippery slope argument"-"the
claim that gay marriage will lead to polygamy, polyamory, and ultimately to
the replacement of marriage itself by an infinitely flexible partnership
system."l 4 Those who have invoked the analogy in order to make the slippery
slope argument "share[] the fear that recognizing gay marriage will lead all
sexual minorities to make similar claims."t 5 Polygamy's proponents have also
invoked the analogy to same-sex marriage. They have invoked the "alternative
12. Cf. Leo Bersani, Foucault, Freud, Fantasy, and Power, 2 Gay & Lesbian Q. 11, 11-12
(1995) (explaining Foucault's warning against interpretation of gay sex by reference to
heteronormative metaphors). Professor Bersani notes:
There may be something to say about gays holding hands after ... erotic play. Don't ...
read their tenderness as the exhausted aftermath of cock-sucking that would 'really' be a
disguised incorporation of the mother's breast. . . . [W]ith no fantasies to fantasize about,
the silenced interpreter becomes the intolerant homophobe.
Id.
13. See Davis, supra note 1. at 1957 ("Curiously, this gay analogy is popular among both
supporters and detractors of expanded recognition for alternative family structures.").
14. Id. at 1981 (quoting Stanley Kurtz, Big Love. from the Set. Nat'l Rev. Online (Mar. 13,
2006, 8:05 AM). http://old.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz.asp (on file with the Columbia Law
Review)). For an example of an academic iteration of the slippery slope argument against
polygamy. see George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage. 15 J.L. & Pol. 581,
628-31 (1999) ("Consider ... a man who marries two wives . . . then immigrates to America,
where he must abandon the second wife. . . . [T]his result seems harsh and pointless . . . [.]

Making exceptions is tricky, though, and pushes the law onto a slippery slope.").
15. Davis. supra note 1. at 1983.
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lifestyles" argument, that both polygamy and same-sex marriage are "equally
legitimate 'alternative' lifestyles that should be tolerated and given legal
recognition."l 6
In arguing that the analogy has had a distracting effect on the polygamy
debate, Davis usefully examines the same-sex marriage analogy itself. She
observes that the same-sex marriage analogy invoked by either side of the
polygamy debate can be traced back to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Lawrence, which was not a same-sex marriage decision but held that Texas's
same-sex sodomy statute violated the requirements for substantive due
process. 17 As Davis points out, some of Lawrence's broad readers have hoped
that it "will provide the foundation for recognizing sexual minorities as
warranting constitutional status, which ultimately could lead to gay marriage as
a federal right," and other readers have "seized on the decision's implications
for plural marriage."1 8
The connection between Lawrence and same-sex marriage has been made
before. After all, the Lawrence decision has been read broadly, narrowly, and
somewhere in between. 19 And the groundbreaking same-sex marriage
decision Goodridge v. Department of Public Health-in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts marriage licensing
statute, which did not permit same-sex couples to marry, violated the
protections of equal liberty and equality in the Massachusetts constitutionwas decided in 2003, the same year that Lawrence was decided. 20 Chief
Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion in Goodridge, relied on
Lawrence to support his authority "to define the liberty of all, [but] not to
mandate [his and the court's] own moral code." 2 1 In this way it seems
reasonable to argue that Lawrence paved the way for successful same-sex
marriage decisions. 22 But it is worth noting that Lawrence was not about
same-sex marriage. In fact, as Dale Carpenter has argued, the plaintiffs in
Lawrence were likely not even in a committed relationship. 23 Nevertheless,

16. Id. at 1957.
17. Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
18. Davis. supra note 1. at 1981.
19. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1379,
1415-18 (2008) (noting some "[c]ourts and commentators . . . have interpreted Lawrence
broadly." whereas other scholars and most courts have adopted a narrow interpretation in spite of
and perhaps because of the decision's ambiguities).
20. 798 N.E.2d 941. 969 (Mass. 2003).
21. Id. at 948 (quoting Lawrence. 539 U.S. at 571).
22. This confirms the connection between Lawrence and same-sex marriage that scholars
have observed. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball. The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: SameSex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas. 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1184. 1185 (2004)
("Lawrence is neither irrelevant to the question of same-sex marriage ... nor dispositive ....
Instead, the relationship between Lawrence and same-sex marriage falls somewhere in the
middle."): Laurence H. Tribe. Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1898, 1933-45 (2004) (noting "[lt]he Lawrence Court's
explicit recognition of the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty" and describing impact of Lawrence on development of
substantive due process doctrine (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. See Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1464.
1478 (2004) ("[Plaintiffs] Lawrence and Garner may have been occasional sexual partners, but
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Lawrence strengthened the connection between same-sex marriage and
polygamy and thereby strengthened either iteration of the analogy between
them.
B. Polygamy's Differences and Davis'sProposal
Davis argues that there are inherent differences between polygamy and
same-sex marriage, and for that matter between polygamy and any dyadic
marriage. Polygamy's defining feature, Davis argues, is its multiplicity"being married to more than one spouse at a time." 24 And because that
multiplicity typically develops over time, "polygamists do not present
themselves as a complete(d) 'group' when they marry, but rather contemplate
adding spouses serially." 25
Davis explains that this sort of serially multiple association "generates
unique transaction costs, bargaining uncertainties, and possibilities for
economic vulnerability and opportunism" that simply do not exist in dyadic
same-sex marriages. 2 6 For example, because "[t]he marriage is constantly
forming and constantly dissolving" as spouses enter and exit the marriage over
time, it is unclear how much voting power or entitlement to property any
spouse has, because that percentage could change at any time during the
marriage.27
Davis argues that one must take into account the differing dynamics in
plural marriages when proposing a system to regulate polygamy that
"reduce[s] the strategic and opportunistic behavior" that characterizes plural
marriages. 2 8 Davis proposes that such a model incorporate default rules for
spouses, 2 9 allow the marital unit to "grow and contract without incurring the
costs and instability of continual dissolution and formation," 30 require
unanimous approval by all existing spouses in order to add a spouse to the
marital unit, 31 provide "gender neutral no-fault rules allowing unilateral exit"
from the marriage by any spouse, 32 require that spouses decide up front
whether a marriage is dyadic or plural, and finally, favor dyadic marriage as a
default. 33 As a result of the specific problems generated by the serial
multiplicity that characterizes polygamy, Davis argues, the analogy between
same-sex marriage and polygamy does not offer any guidance for someonelike Davis-who endeavors to regulate polygamy.

were not in a long-term, committed relationship when they were arrested.").
24. Davis. supra note 1. at 2007.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2002.
27. See id. at 1990 (describing how "the addition of each subsequent spouse increase the
claims on the marital 'pie.' and thus "alter a spouse's influence within the unit").
28. Id. at 2019.
29. Id. at 2004-06.
30. Id. at 2007.
31. Id. at 2008.
32. Id. at 2011.
33. Id. at 2013-16.
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II. FROM SODOMY TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND BACK AGAIN

Perhaps part of the reason that the same-sex marriage analogy to
polygamy has caused a bottleneck in the polygamy debate is that the analogy
between same-sex marriage and polygamy is frankly not very good. This Part
describes the fundamental differences between same-sex marriage and
polygamy before arguing that sodomy is a much better analogy to polygamy
than is same-sex marriage. Despite the differences between same-sex marriage
and polygamy, the analogy between them has curiously persisted since the
Court decided Lawrence. This Part then offers a possible rationale for the
analogy's persistence despite fundamental differences between its two
analogues.
A. The Analogy's Problems
Even though both same-sex marriage and plural marriage relate to
marriage, the analogy between them is inapt because of polygamy's serial
multiplicity but also for two additional and very obvious reasons.
1. The Fightfor Same-Sex MarriageHas Not Been All That Successful. First, the effort to legally recognize same-sex marriages has not been all that
successful. Thus, it is curious why proponents of polygamy wish to use it as
an analogue when the right to same-sex marriage is not yet widely accepted.
Currently, same-sex marriages are recognized in four states and in the District
of Columbia. 34 This represents tremendous progress in the battle for marriage

34. Same-sex marriage is legally recognized in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn.
2008) (holding state statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage impermissibly discriminated
against gay people on account of their sexual orientation in violation of Connecticut's
constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating
Massachusetts law prohibiting same-sex couples from "the protections, benefits, and obligations
of civil marriage"); Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage. N.Y.
Times, Jun. 3, 2009, at A19 ("The New Hampshire Legislature approved revisions to a same-sex
marriage bill . . . making the state the sixth to let gay couples wed."); Nikita Stewart & Tim
Craig. D.C. Council Votes to Recognize Gay Nuptials Elsewhere; Decision Comes as Vermont
Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al ("Vermont became the fourth
state to recognize same-sex marriage . . . ."). Until recently. same-sex marriage was also
recognized in Iowa and California. See The Iowa House v Zach Wahls and His Moms,
Democracy
in
America,
The
Economist,
Feb.
4,
2011,
at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/02/politics and morality gay marri
age (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Iowa's Republican-controlled House of
Representatives voted 62-37 . . . to approve a proposed amendment to the state constitution that
would ban same-sex marriage, undoing the controversial 2009 Iowa Supreme Court decision.").
The Iowa Supreme Court decision. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). held a
provision in the Iowa Code prohibiting same-sex marriages unconstitutional because it violated
the equal protection clause of Iowa's constitution. In California, gay marriages have been ruled
legal. But as a result of a stay imposed on the Northern District of California's ruling in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (overruling Proposition 8 and
asserting "the right to marry protects an individual's choice of marital partner regardless of
gender") until the Ninth Circuit decides the appeal, same-sex marriage is not yet legally
recognized in California. See Lisa Leff, Calif. AG Asks Appeals Court to Lift Gay Marriage Ban
While Prop. 8 Case Winds Through Court, Associated Press, March 1. 2011. available at Factiva,
Doc No. APRS000020110301e731002ky ("California's attorney general ... joined lawyers for
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equality, but is far from a win. This is not meant to denigrate those who have
expended efforts to win marriage equality; a gradual victory may be all that
those fighting for marriage equality desire. Bill Eskridge, for example, has
argued that the path to legally recognizing same-sex marriage should be "stepby-step and incremental." 35 And though the result of the current effort to
federally legalize same-sex marriage 36 is as yet uncertain, the move to do so
has been criticized by some of same-sex marriage's original and staunchest
supporters. 37
2. Same-Sex Marriage Has Not Been Criminalized.- Second, as Davis
notes in her Article, another important difference between same-sex marriage
and polygamy is that polygamy has been criminalized whereas same-sex
"unions were denied recognition and licensure, but there were no prosecutions
for attempting same-sex marriage." 38 Quite differently, Davis explains,
"plural marriages are a crime, with prosecutions often based on courts finding
'constructive marriages,' an ironic and bizarre form of recognition." 39
B. Sodomy: A Better Analogy
Same-sex marriage and polygamy are different in some pretty obvious
ways. Sodomy and polygamy, on the other hand, are much more closely
analogous. Of course, sodomy does not (necessarily) possess the quality of
serial multiplicity that polygamy does, but the effort to legalize it has been
successful and it, like polygamy, has been criminalized. The legalization of
sodomy-or, more precisely, the illegality of statutes banning sodomyoccurred in 2003, when the Court decided Lawrence. Statutes like the Texas
same-sex sodomy statute that was held unconstitutional in Lawrence40 may not
have been enforced for some time before the Court decided Lawrence,4 1 but
sodomy was criminalized just as polygamy is. In fact, the lack of enforcement
likens antipolygamy laws to antisodomy laws, 4 2 making the resistance to

two same-sex couples and the city of San Francisco in asking a federal appeals court to allow gay
marriages to resume while the court considers the constitutionality of the state's voter-approved
ban.").
35. William N. Eskridge. Jr.. Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A
Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 641, 647 (2000).
36. See Perry. 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Am. Found. for Equal Rights. Our Work, at
http://www.afer.org/our-work/our-arguments/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited May 18, 2011) (discussing Foundation's efforts regarding California's Proposition 8).
37. See. e.g., Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight California Gay Marriage
Ban, N.Y. Times. May 28, 2009. at Al (reporting some in gay-rights movement "expressed ...
outright annoyance at the possibility that a loss before the Supreme Court could spoil the chances
of future lawsuits on behalf of same-sex marriage").
Matt Coles, the director of the LGBT project at the American Civil Liberties Union, told the
New York Times that filing a federal lawsuit was "not something that didn't occur to us":
"Federal court? Wow. Never thought of that." Id.
38. Davis. supra note 1. at 1987.
39. Id.
40. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06(a) (West 2003).
41. See Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms,
and Social Panoptics, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 643, 651-53 (2001) (describing lack of enforcement of
sodomy laws).
42. See Davis. supra note 1. at 1960 n.11 (discussing historical enforcement of
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analogizing polygamy to sodomy even more puzzling.
C. The Effort to Downplay Sex and Difference
To be sure, this Response is not the first to analogize sodomy and
polygamy. 43 What has not been examined is why the same-sex marriage
analogy to polygamy has persisted if it presents such obvious problems.
It is not really surprising that an analogy to sodomy has not been popular.
Despite the fact that sodomy and polygamy are more closely analogous than
are same-sex marriage and polygamy, sodomy highlights the ways in which
gays are sexual, and the ways in which gays are different. Highlighting either
is risky.
Mary Anne Case argued in 1993-ten years before either Lawrence or
Goodridge was decided-that the presence of same-sex couples and the details
of their copulation were notably absent from the history of gay rights
litigation. 44 Case observed that "[c]ourts accord the most favorable treatment
to those gay men and lesbians involved in close, long-term relationships from
which the sexual aspect has perforce been removed . ..

5." This observation

may be undermined by the real story behind Lawrence.46 But the real story
behind Lawrence did not appear in the case's record, nor has it affected the
way Lawrence has been read since it was decided. 47
The fact that Lawrence is credited with paving the way for same-sex
marriage actually supports Case's theory about gay couples and copulation.
The theoretical implications of Lawrence are many. Some are more overtly
sexual than others. The Fifth Circuit relied on Lawrence in striking down the
Texas Obscene Device Act. 4 8 The Eleventh Circuit, in roughly the same
situation four years earlier, declined the opportunity to rely on Lawrence to
invalidate a similar law in Alabama. 4 9 But these are not the cases that come to
mind when one thinks of Lawrence.
Lawrence has become a decision about same-sex marriage. And while at
the time Case wrote, there were no court decisions favoring same-sex

antipolygamy laws in various "high-profile" cases).
43. See. e.g., id. at 1984 nn.88-89 (citing two examples of litigants analogizing polygyamy
to sodomy ruling in Lawrence).
44. See generally Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights. 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643
(1993) (commenting on absence of same-sex couples from history of gay rights litigation, as
reconstructed by Pat Cain in Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1551 (1993)).
45. Id. at 1644.
46. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting plaintiffs in Lawrence not in
committed relationship).
47. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
48. See Reliable Consultants Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Because of
Lawrence, the issue before us is whether the Texas statute impermissibly burdens the individual's
substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing.").
49. See Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (1lth Cir. 2004) ("[W]e
reject the ACLU's request that we redefine the constitutional right to privacy to cover the
commercial distribution of sex toys.").
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marriage, 5 0 it is unsurprising in light of her theory that a case about sodomy is
now known as a case about marriage. Attitudes toward gays and lesbians have
certainly changed since 1993, as they have since 2003, but those attitudes still
seem to depend on homosexuals' "behaving 'just like everybody else."' 5 1
Copulation seems still to be taboo, even after the Supreme Court squarely
addressed it.
III. STRATEGIZING WITH PURPOSE
Gays, lesbians, and polygamists are, in some ways, just like everybody
else. But in some ways they are not. The fact that the sodomy analogy to
polygamy has not been invoked in the way that the same-sex marriage analogy
to polygamy has been is unsurprising. Those engaged in the debate about the
legal recognition of plural marriage-some of whom are members of the
LGBT rights movement and some of whom are not-seem to have taken a cue
from the LGBT rights movement itself: Highlight sameness and downplay
difference. While some sodomy statutes applied equally to opposite-sex
couples and the act of sodomy is possible between opposite-sex couples,
sodomy statutes were directed against homosexuals because sodomy was the
act that conceptually separated homosexuals from heterosexuals. 52
But Lawrence struck down statutes that specifically differentiated gay
people. For that reason, it should no longer be taboo to use those statutes as
analogues in subsequent battles for civil rights, particularly when the analogy
that has been invoked (that to same-sex marriage) suffers from a difference in
kind. But the persistence of this bad analogy offers a lesson, not only to those
who advocate for polygamy but also to those who advocate for LGBT rights.
The LGBT rights movement has, in the past few years, resisted the
incorporation of certain constituent groups-transgender people, bisexuals, and
polygamists, among others.
The incorporation of these other sexual
minorities-like the sodomy analogy-highlights the ways in which gays and
lesbians are different from everybody else. This Part urges those who advocate
for LGBT rights to be aware of the extent to which they are wedded to
sameness. Difference is not always bad.
A. FracturedMovement
The LGBT rights movement is regrettably fractured. In order to secure
victories in its two biggest battles-for same-sex marriage recognition and for
the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace-LGBT rights advocates
have "intentionally le[ft] parts of the community behind." 53 The recent

50. The decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), which was subsequently
invalidated by the 1998 amendment to the Hawaii constitution, was issued after the publication of
Case's article.
51. See Case, supra note 44, at 1664 (explaining cases in which gay couples had been
afforded certain rights were also cases in which couples were not having sex).
52. See Lawrence v. Texas. 539 U.S. 558. 568-71 (2003) (noting while laws banning
sodomy had not always been directed against homosexuals in particular, beginning in the 1970's
these laws began to single out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution).
53. Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities. 19 Colum. J.
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exclusion of transgender people from an earlier draft of the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA) 5 4 on the theory that their inclusion would prevent
ENDA's eventual passage, which has not yet occurred, provides a notable
example.
If enacted into law, the most recent version of ENDA, like the 2009
version, "would prohibit the states, as well as other employers, from
discriminating against their employees on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity." 5 5 ENDA was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Representative Barney Frank on April 6, 2011 and in the Senate by Senator
Jeff Merkley on April 13, 2011.56 In addition, previous versions of ENDA,
which would have prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
but not gender identity, have been introduced in every Congress since the
103rd Congress, with the exception of the 109th Congress. 57 This exclusion
caused sharp division among LGBT rights advocates. In particular, the Human
Rights Campaign (HRC) infamously supported a noninclusive ENDA, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation but not on the basis
of gender identity, because HRC concluded that a more inclusive ENDA
would not pass out of the House of Representatives. 5 8 HRC received a lot of
criticism for its position on ENDA, 59 which it later reversed, explaining that its
earlier opposition to a transinclusive ENDA "would do more to advance

Gender & L. 21, 22 n.6 (2010) (citing Cynthia Laird, Tense Meeting with HRC Over ENDA, Bay
Area Reporter, Jan. 10, 2008, at http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=2589
(on file with the Columbia Law Review): Transgender Inclusion May Spell Trouble for ENDA,
Workplace
Professor
Blog
(Oct.
3,
2007)
at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2007/10/trangender-incl.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review)): see also Katherine Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,
15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 236, 240 (2006) (observing gay rights movement has become
increasingly assimilationist); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 Emory L.J. 1361,
1365 (2005) (analyzing ways in which Goodridge decision employed "like straight" logic).
54. See H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 2(2) (2007) (prohibiting employment discrimination on
basis of sexual orientation but not gender identity).
55. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811. 112th Cong. §2(2) (2011); H.R.
1397, 112th Cong. §2(2) (2011): see also Recent Proposed Legislation-Congress Considers Bill
to Prohibit Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,
123 Harv. L. Rev. 1803. 1803 (2010) (analyzing 2009 version of ENDA).
56. S. 811: H.R. 1397.
57. See Recent Proposed Legislation-Congress Considers Bill to Prohibit Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. supra note 55, at 1806 &
n.23. (noting history of ENDA and citing Jill D. Weinberg, Gender Nonconformity: An Analysis
of Perceived Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protection Under the Employment NonDiscrimination Act. 44 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1. 9-12 (2009)).
58. See Laird. supra note 53 ("While HRC had previously gone on record as supporting only
ENDA that included both sexual orientation and gender identity protections, it abandoned that
position once . . . lawmakers on Capitol Hill determined there were not enough votes for the
inclusive ENDA to pass out of the House of Representatives.").
59. See HRC T's Up for More Peaceful ENDA Discourse, Good as You Blog (Mar. 26,
2009, 8:24 PM). at http://www.goodasyou.org/good asyou/2009/03/hrc-ts-up-for-more-peaceenda-discourse.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Remember in 2007 when their
failure
to
oppose
a
non-inclusive
ENDA
led
many
LGBT
activists
to
Harangue/Ridiculue[sic]/Challenge HRC?
Well happily, the future seems more Hopeful
Regarding Cooperation on passing an inclusive measure.").
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inclusive legislation." 6 0 Transgender and bisexual people are minorities
among minorities. Their identities overlap to a certain extent with those of
gays and lesbians but at times diverge.
Public support for a transinclusive ENDA ultimately brought about
support among LGBT rights advocates for a version of ENDA that prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, which
describes the latest versions of the bill which were introduced this spring. 6 1
The interests of transgender people have not yet been fully integrated into the
LGBT rights movement's goals, but litigation, 6 2 scholarly attention, 63 and the
political attention that the ENDA debate attracted have heightened the
collective sensitivity to the harms that transgender people face.
The LGBT rights movement has incorporated transgender people to some
degree but need not wait for a major event to include other constituent groups
like bisexuals and polygamists. Scholars such as Katherine Franke, Nancy
Levit, and Marc Spindelman have observed that the pragmatic strategy for
lawyers litigating for LGBT rights has been to use the "'homo kinship' model
or 'like straight' logic to argue for parental rights or same-sex marriage." 64
60. HRC Finally Ready to Back Trans-Inclusive ENDA, Queerty, Mar. 26, 2009, at
http://www.queerty.coml/hrc-finally-ready-to-back-trans-inclusive-enda-20090326/
(on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
61. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (describing most recent version of
ENDA).
62. See. e.g.. Barnes v. Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729. 737-38 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming Smith
on same grounds for discrimination against transgender plaintiff Phelicia Barnes); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572-75 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding transgender plaintiff Jimmie Smith
could state actionable claim for discrimination under Title VII); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc.. 742
F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding, in case involving transgender plaintiff Karen
Ulane, Title VII's prohibition against "sex" discrimination did not cover discrimination based on
gender identity); Schroer v. Billington. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300. 303 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding
Diane Schroer experienced discrimination in violation of Title VII when employer rescinded job
offer after Schroer told employer she was transitioning from male to female).
63. See. e.g.. Transgender Rights 3-24, 51-69 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang &
Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006) (tracking political history of transgender rights and challenge
binary system presents for transgender rights); Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We
Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality. 101
Colum. L. Rev. 392, 395 (2001) (noting "[t]ransgender rights litigation presents an opportunity to
broaden judicial understandings of sex by helping courts comprehend that gender identity, rather
than anatomy, is the primary determinant of sex."); Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer.
Transitional Discrimination, 18 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 651, 666-72 (2009) [hereinafter
Glazer & Kramer, Transitional Discrimination] (arguing need for antidiscrimination law to
incorporate transitional identity as one worth protecting): Dean Spade. Resisting Medicine.
Re/modeling Gender, 18 Berkeley Women's L.J. 15, 17-18 (2003) (examining role of medical
evidence to track transgender experience); Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Trans Fat,
Law & Soc. Inquiry (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 5-6, 22-30), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1337129 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (reviewing Anna Kirkland. Fat Rights: Dilemmas of Difference and Personhood (2008)
and analogizing discrimination against fat plaintiffs to discrimination against transgendered
plaintiffs).
64. Levit. supra note 53. at 23 & n.7 (relying on. inter alia. the Combined Statement of
ACLU. GLAAD. Equality Federation. Lambda Legal, & NCLR. Make Change, Not Lawsuits, at
http://www.thetaskforceactionfund.org/take action/guides/change not lawsuits.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (last visited May 18. 2011). which urged strategic lawsuits) see also
Franke, supra note 53. at 239 (expressing concern that "the rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay
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This logic dictates, for example, that LGBT rights lawyers should litigate cases
in states where residents are more likely to agree that gays and lesbians should
have the right to marry. This logic also dictates that lawyers arguing for LGBT
rights should treat their cases like controlled experiments; only one factortheir clients' sexual preference for members of the same sex-differentiates
their clients from everybody else. Unfortunately, this logic has caused the
movement for LGBT to exclude, at times intentionally, important constituent
groups.
B. Getting Back to Our Roots by Adding Branches
The strategy of the LGBT rights movement has gotten in the way of its
purpose. The strategy of the movement has been to highlight the ways in
which gays and lesbians, and to some extent transgender people, are similar to
normal, heterosexual people. While this strategy has not been entirely
unreasonable, 6 5 it has caused the movement to exclude those who have
experienced discrimination for the same reason that gays and lesbians havebecause the sex they have is different from monogamous, heterosexual sex that
occurs within a dyadic marriage.
And the discrimination harms that
polygamous people face are real. 66 For example, they risk losing custody of
their children, 67 losing their jobs, 6 8 verbal abuse, 6 9 and other forms of
prejudice. 70
Because the current strategy has produced gains, it is reasonable for those
who advocate on behalf of LGBT people to continue employing that strategy.
But the current strategy grew out of a history of protecting difference. 7 1 It is
rights movement has now become 'the couple"'); Spindelman, supra note 53, at 1368-75
(explaining success of "like straight" arguments in Goodridge).
65. It has, after all, generated laudable short-term gains for the advancement of rights for
gays and lesbians. Some would argue that it has generated gains for transgender people, as well,
though I would contend, as I have before, that these gains have not been won in the appropriate
way. See Glazer & Kramer. Transitional Discrimination, supra note 63, at 655-58. 665-71
(urging adoption of cause of action for transitional discrimination-discrimination on basis of
transitional identity-in cases involving transgender employment discrimination instead of
application of gender-nonconformity principle from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228
(1989)).
66. See Ann E. Tweedy. Polyamory as a Sexual Orientation, U. Cin. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2011)
(manuscript
at
43-45),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1632653 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing various discrimination harms polymorous people face).
67. See Elizabeth F. Emens. Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 310-12 (2004) (retelling story of mother who
lost custody of her child because she lived with and considered herself married to two men).
68. See id. at 362 ("People living in polyamorous relationships worry about losing their jobs
due to discrimination based on their relationships, and no statute or principle has been held to
protect individuals from such job discrimination.").
69. See Tweedy, supra note 66, at 44-45 (citing statistical evidence that "about a quarter of
respondents had experienced verbal abuse based on their polyamorism").
70. See id at 44 ("[O]ut polyamory has been associated generally with social stigma and
attendant loss of power within monogamous society. such that poly individuals report having lost
friends, being alienated from their families, and being ostracized from spiritual and other
communities as a result of revealing their polyamory." (internal quotations omitted)).
71. See Cain. supra note 44, at 1587-95, 1612-17 (describing early litigation efforts to
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important not to forget about difference entirely, because without difference
we would not have any civil rights battles to fight.
CONCLUSION

Adrienne Davis argues that the analogy between same-sex marriage and
polygamy has distracted attention from the feature of polygamy that presents
the particular challenge for its regulation, namely its characteristic of serial
multiplicity. This Response has considered why the same-sex marriage
analogy might have had the distracting effect that Davis observes. Sodomy
and polygamy present a more obvious analogous pairing than do same-sex
marriage and polygamy, but that analogy has not been invoked with the same
frequency as the same-sex marriage analogy.
Sodomy, unlike same-sex marriage, highlights the ways in which
homosexuals and heterosexuals differ. Marriage is a way for homosexuals to
be just like everybody else. Polygamy is different from dyadic marriage, and it
is different from homosexuality. Thus, it is unsurprising that those who wish
to promote polygamy have resisted the analogy to sodomy in favor of the
analogy to marriage. But their resistance presents an opportunity to examine
the incorporation of difference within a movement.
This Response has argued that the sodomy analogy to polygamy should
be invoked because it is simply a better analogy to polygamy than is same-sex
marriage. In addition, this Response has argued that the resistance with which
the sodomy analogy to polygamy has been met is analogous to the resistance
with which polygamists have faced from the LGBT rights movement. Neither
promotes the purpose of the movement, and this Response has argued for the
incorporation of difference with respect to both.
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target antisodomy laws causing movement to shift strategy).

